Published: 2026-06-25 · updated: 2026-06-27
The first regular budget of the Radev cabinet arrives with a 5.7%-of-GDP deficit and an excessive-deficit procedure just months after euro adoption. We line up the verified figures from the 2026 Budget Law and the 2026–2028 medium-term forecast, gather the reactions of politicians and economists (sourced line by line), and run the claims themselves through our budget simulator: the deficit, the €2,300 social-security cap and the party-subsidy cut all check out; 'you can't consolidate while debt explodes' is arithmetically false; and the 'soft' revenue and the 'Videnov-era' comparison do not survive scrutiny.
On 24 June 2026 the government of Progressive Bulgaria tabled its first regular budget in the National Assembly — and immediately found itself at the centre of the sharpest fiscal dispute in years. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Galab Donev presented a framework with a consolidated-fiscal-programme (КФП) deficit of 5.7% of GDP — about €7.2bn — and promised the country would not return below 3% until 2028.[^euronews] The opposition demanded the budget be withdrawn,[^db-ottegli] economists called it "a despairing demonstration of fear" and "zero reform,"[^plovdiv24-yankov] and the comparisons reached all the way back to "the Videnov era."[^fakti-obzor]
This article lines up the verified numbers from the official documents, gathers what the politicians and economists actually say (with a source for every claim), and then runs those claims through our budget simulator to see which survive the arithmetic and which are mostly rhetoric — and finally cost out what it would take to reach 3% as early as this year.
The figures below are from the tabled draft State Budget Law of the Republic of Bulgaria for 2026 (ЗДБРБ-2026) and the Updated Medium-Term Budget Forecast 2026–2028 (АСБП), which serves as the law's explanatory memorandum.[^doc]
| Indicator (2026) | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Deficit, cash basis (КФП) | 5.7% of GDP · €7,191.9M | → 3.8% (2027) → 3.0% (2028) |
| Deficit, general government (ESA) | 5.4% of GDP | → 3.9% → 3.3% |
| Revenue (КФП) | €49,615.3M (39.6% of GDP) | vs €44,014.7M in 2025 |
| Expenditure (КФП) | €56,807.2M (45.4% of GDP) | highest level in the three-year horizon |
| Nominal GDP | €125,247M | real growth 2.6%, deflator 5.2% |
| Average inflation (HICP) | 4.3% | 5.2% at year-end |
| Government debt | €37.7bn · 30.1% of GDP | → 33.2% (2027) → 35.2% (2028) |
| Maximum new debt for 2026 | up to €10.1bn | incl. up to €3.26bn under the SAFE instrument |
| Fiscal reserve (31 Dec 2026) | ≥ €2.6bn | statutory floor |
Key to the whole dispute: 5.7% is the cash (КФП) measure, while 5.4% is the ESA 2010 measure for the general-government sector — the one against which the Maastricht 3% is judged and on which the European Commission is opening an excessive-deficit procedure. Both are far above the 3% ceiling.
The inflation spike isn't a Bulgarian phenomenon: the forecast assumes a rise in oil and gas prices after March 2026, tied to the military conflict in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz — on the assumption that the conflict is relatively short (to mid-2026), after which prices normalise.[^doc]
This is the first regular budget of the "Progressive Bulgaria" majority — the party of former president Rumen Radev, who won the April 2026 election[^cik] and became prime minister of a regular government, with Galab Donev as deputy PM and finance minister.[^econ-gov] The framework was late because of the political turbulence: the previous draft (December 2025) was repealed, the country ran on a "budget-extension law," and the regular budget only appeared mid-year. That is exactly why the government describes the deficit as inherited — the result of "years of accelerated expenditure growth without a matching rise in revenue."[^euronews] The same is the European Commission's assessment: large, persistent increases on the expenditure side, financed by short-term rather than structural measures, have produced sustained deficits.[^sofiaglobe]
The government presents 5.7% not as a floor but as an improvement — "narrowing the projected deficit from 7.4% to 5.7%," if you account for what would happen with no measures.[^euronews] Here is the package (all effects are for 2026, as announced):
Revenue measures
Expenditure measures
For completeness: 2026 capital expenditure is €9,360.6M (€4,028.9M national + €5,331.7M European, incl. the Recovery Plan — 2026 is the last big year of the RRF); defence reaches 2.15% of GDP (€2,692.8M) on the path to 3.5% "core" defence by 2035 after the NATO summit in The Hague.[^doc]
Here we run the claims through the simulator — the same engine (bgTaxPolicy.ts, bgFiscalProjection.ts) behind the public tool, described in detail here. The results below are from an actual run of the engine, not a back-of-the-envelope estimate.
1. Raising the МОД €2,112 → €2,300 really does yield ~€90M — but as an annual effect. The simulator's central estimate is €88.3M (range €57.5–114.8M depending on how "heavy" the high-income tail is; "central" means at the middle tail assumption, not an average) — right around the Finance Ministry's stated €90.8M. But the catch is timing: the measure only starts on 1 August, so the actual 2026 cash is barely ~5/12 of that — about €37M. Because the Ministry's figure matches our _annual_ estimate, booking it in full as 2026 revenue front-loads it — its contribution to this year's deficit is smaller. There is a second catch — for the "we won't cut incomes" line: raising the ceiling is in reality a higher contribution burden on income between €2,112 and €2,300 — for the worker (less net) and for the employer (higher cost). That is exactly what Bozhidar Bozhanov of DB means: "from 1 August business is burdened."[^bb]
2. The party-subsidy cut really is ~€2.1M. €1.09 × 2.861M votes = €3.1M on a full-year basis; for the eight months from 30 April that is €2.1M. Confirmed.
3. "You can't consolidate to 3% while debt explodes" — a claim by Assoc. Prof. Sterio Nozharov (UNWE) — is arithmetically false.[^econbg] Run through the debt-dynamics engine, every positive deficit (even a shrinking one) adds debt each year — so the deficit can fall while debt rises at the same time. That isn't a paradox; it's the definition of a deficit. The official path shows it plainly: deficit 5.4% → 3.9% → 3.3%, while debt climbs 32.3% → 33.8% → 35.7% of GDP. And at 35% of GDP, Bulgarian debt remains among the 3–4 lowest in the EU. "Explosion" is a strong word, but not an accurate one.
4. The government itself books a worse deficit than Brussels forecasts. The simulator's baseline rests on the EC's spring 2026 forecast — an ESA deficit of −4.1% for 2026. The government, however, books −5.4% — 1.3 percentage points (about €1.63bn) worse. That's unusual: governments are normally more optimistic than the Commission, here it's the reverse. The reading that the new cabinet is "clearing house" in its first year is supported by Petar Vitanov (Progressive Bulgaria): "we inherited €2.2bn of unpaid, hidden invoices."[^vitanov]
5. The "soft" revenue measures carry serious risk — as the Fiscal Council warns too. For measures of the "additional collection" (+€200M) and "more from gambling" (+€100M) type, the simulator applies a realisation factor of 0.40 — i.e. it banks only about €80M and €40M respectively, not the full amounts. Cutting the BDZ/NKZHI/Posts subsidies by €285.3M is ~90% of the entire available subsidy envelope — a "hard" cut that large the engine flags as unlikely. This partly confirms the Fiscal Council's worry about overstated revenue (in its opinion on the previous framework — a shortfall risk of €3.5–4.7bn).[^fiscal] We also re-priced the entire consolidation package measure by measure: the government books measures worth ~€2.46bn, while our independent count credits ~€1.94bn — a gap of about €514M, coming mainly from the "soft" revenue (banked at 40%), one-off receipts and the mid-year start effect.
In short: the skeleton of the budget passes the arithmetic check (deficit, debt, МОД, subsidies), but part of the consolidation — at least a few hundred million euros of "collection" and "efficiency" — is more a promise than secured revenue.
The reaction is overwhelmingly critical — both in parliament and among economists.
The opposition. GERB-SDS, through Toma Bikov, made the historical reference: if the budget passes in this form, "Bulgaria's progress will resemble the mid-1990s, when the BSP and Zhan Videnov governed with a full majority," and called the framework "a sign of a total absence of reform" — recalling that Radev himself, as president, had demanded the resignation of the "Zhelyazkov" cabinet over a budget with a 3% deficit.[^bikov] PP-DB demanded the budget be withdrawn and reworked down to 3%.[^db-ottegli] Asen Vasilev (PP) called it "more scandalous" than the budget that toppled the "Zhelyazkov" cabinet;[^db-statement] DB spoke of "the same old budget" with no reforms[^db-statement] and "a whiff of the Videnov era," and Martin Dimitrov said "a deficit of 5.7% hasn't been seen since Zhan Videnov."[^fakti-obzor] Kostadin Kostadinov (Vazrazhdane) was categorical: "a complete catastrophe."[^kostadinov]
Asen Vasilev's figures — a check. The PP leader also made two concrete numerical claims at a press conference that deserve a separate check — because they hold up differently.[^vasilev-pc]
The first is about maintenance/operating costs (издръжка), which Vasilev illustrates with "electricity, water, telephone, repairs, toilet paper": that they jump 35% (≈ €1.5bn) and that not spending them would take the deficit down to 4.7%. The number is right — but for the cash "maintenance" line in the КФП, not just the utilities he lists. Appendix 3 of the АСБП shows the whole line rising from €4,251.5M to €5,785.9M (2025→2026) — +€1,534M, or +36%. The governing side disputes exactly this figure: budget-committee chair Konstantin Prodanov points out that on the ESA basis the "intermediate consumption" of the general-government sector rises by 23%, not 35% — from €5,610.4M to €6,902.4M (Table II-6) — and that cars aren't maintenance at all but capital spending.[^prodanov] Both numbers are right — they just measure different things: Vasilev cites the cash КФП line (+36%), Prodanov the accrual ESA category (+23%); Vasilev's higher rate is partly an artefact of the low 2025 cash base (deferred payments). Either way it is genuine national spending: €1.53bn is 1.2% of GDP, so dropping it lowers the cash deficit from 5.7% to about 4.5%. But — as Prodanov stresses — maintenance also covers unavoidable operating costs (hospital consumables, school heating, fuel for ambulances and patrol cars), so not all of it is "waste" that can simply be cut.
The second is about capital expenditure: €9.3bn planned, a €3.5bn increase, "if we don't do them, that's another 3% of the deficit." His figures are right, but the deficit conclusion misleads. The sums tie out — capital expenditure €5,870.1M (2025 execution) → €9,360.6M (2026 plan), a difference of ≈ €3.5bn. But 57% of that €9.3bn is European money (€5,331.7M of European financing, incl. the RRF, against just €4,028.9M national), and 2026 is the last big year of the Recovery Plan — which is why capital expenditure falls to €6.7bn in 2027. And most importantly: the European capital programme is covered by European grants — "grants from abroad" in revenue jump to €5,370.7M in 2026 — so this spending is deficit-neutral: don't do it, and you lose the grants too. So "another 3% of the deficit" is a big overstatement — only the national financing (€4,028.9M) weighs on the deficit, and its increase over 2025 is about €1.3bn — i.e. close to 1 percentage point, not 3. He also compares the 2026 plan with 2025 execution; given chronic under-execution of capital spending (2025: just 73%), the real increase will likely be smaller.
The economists. Nikola Yankov (Expat Capital): "A despairing demonstration of fear. Zero reform. Shocking… We have no problem in the country — no recession, no disasters, no war, no pandemic… Bulgaria deserves a budget with a 3% deficit."[^plovdiv24-yankov] Assoc. Prof. Sterio Nozharov (UNWE): "The budget contains mathematical paradoxes, legal absurdities and contradictions… Are there any structural reforms and consolidation at all? The direct answer is none." He calls part of the expected revenue growth "disguised inflation revenue" and asks "where is our buffer against the next external shock?"[^econbg] Former deputy PM Nikolay Vasilev called it "the most disappointing, reform-free budget in years," pointing to more than 12,000 vacant administrative posts that no one is cutting.[^safenews-vasilev]
The Institute for Market Economics (IME) is more restrained but no less sceptical: its position is that the budget should essentially be "frozen" for predictability and that there is "no deferral" of deficit consolidation; according to chief economist Lachezar Bogdanov, the core unresolved question is how to fund the spending without a serious tax increase.[^ime]
The government. Donev sticks to the message "we will not strip away rights and we will not cut incomes" and describes 5.7% as "the first step toward financial recovery," targeting 3% in 2028.[^euronews] His definition of the problem is memorable: "an over-deficit is when your money runs out ten days before payday."[^mediapool] He also cooled expectations that personal contributions for civil servants would plug the hole: "an over-expectation was created… but that simply cannot happen" — affected workers' net income is preserved through compensation.[^sega]
The governing majority. Petar Vitanov (Progressive Bulgaria): "The deficit trajectory was above 7%, we cut it by 2% in four months"; "these administration cuts — we're the ones making them; no one had done it before."[^vitanov] Budget-committee chair Konstantin Prodanov defended the framework with the numbers: the "ready" 3%-deficit budget the opposition claims to have inherited is a fiction — its revenue (€50.4bn) was inflated, when 2025 actually collected only ~€44bn. He also insists incomes are not "frozen": the minimum wage rises 12.6% to €620.20 from 1 January, public-sector salaries by 5%, and pension spending grows by ~€1.2bn over 2025.[^prodanov]
Independent voices "for." The clearest defence from outside government came from Georgi Vuldzhev (EKIP): "The draft budget is a step in the right direction and a significant improvement over what was proposed in December." He thinks the deficit could even be eliminated within a full term — but also doubts whether the Finance Ministry team will be ambitious enough.[^econbg] From the BNB Governing Council, Lyubomir Karimanski urged that criticism not be premature and noted that off-budget capital injections (e.g. into the Bulgarian Development Bank) can hide the real picture.[^karimanski]
The unions are split on the specific measures. KNSB voiced "categorical disagreement" with the linear 10% cut to wage spending, but supported raising the МОД;[^knsb] chief economist Lyuboslav Kostov called the claim that the minimum wage "strains" the budget "economic demagoguery."[^kostov] From Podkrepa, Dimitar Manolov was philosophical: "in a situation like this, no good budget can be offered… they did what they could," but demanded a review of all 304 administrative structures.[^manolov]
Employers are sharper. Vasil Velev (AIKB): "A 5.7% deficit is striking, we haven't had one like it… for several years we've been left on a sled heading for the cliff."[^aikb] (For KRIB, BIA and BCCI we found no explicitly dated statement specifically on this budget — so we attribute no position to them.)
Europe. On 3 June 2026 — only about five months after Bulgaria joined the euro area on 1 January — the European Commission recommended opening an excessive-deficit procedure. In its assessment the EC notes that spending has grown mainly on pensions and public-sector wages, financed by "short-term or ad-hoc measures," which raises fiscal risks.[^edp] At the same time the credit ratings held steady: S&P affirmed BBB+ with a positive outlook in May 2026.
| Claim | Who says it | Check |
|---|---|---|
| The deficit is 5.7% of GDP (~€7.2bn) | Government | Confirmed — the arithmetic is consistent |
| МОД €2,112→€2,300 yields +€90.8M | Government | Confirmed as an annual effect — central estimate €88.3M; 2026 cash ~€37M (starts 1 Aug) |
| Party-subsidy cut = €2.1M | Government | Confirmed |
| "We won't cut incomes" | Government | Partly — true for rates and benefits, but the МОД and personal contributions do reduce net pay for affected groups |
| "Consolidating to 3% while debt explodes = contradiction" | Nozharov (UNWE) | Refuted — a falling deficit + rising debt is normal; 35% debt is among the lowest in the EU |
| "Revenue is overstated" | Fiscal Council | Partly confirmed — the "soft" ~€600M is high-risk; the model banks ~40% |
| "Zero reform" / no structural change | Yankov, Nozharov, Vasilev | Largely true — the measures are mostly one-off and parametric, not structural |
| "A deficit like Videnov's" | PP-DB, GERB | Misleading (see below) |
| The deficit is worse even than the EC's forecast | Our check | Confirmed — −5.4% vs −4.1% (~€1.63bn) |
| Maintenance jumps 35% (≈ €1.5bn) | Asen Vasilev (PP) | Confirmed (cash basis) — +36% on КФП (€4,251.5→5,785.9M), but +23% on ESA (Prodanov); real spending → deficit ~4.5% |
| €3.5bn capital increase = "3% of deficit" | Asen Vasilev (PP) | Misleading — figures right, but 57% is EU grants (deficit-neutral); really ~1pp |
The "Videnov era" deserves a separate look — the most powerful rhetorical figure in the dispute. By size the deficit really is large, and the government itself calls it an "over-deficit." But the economic analogy doesn't hold: 1996–1997 was hyperinflation (hundreds of percent), a banking and currency crisis, at a time when the currency board was only introduced in July 1997. In 2026 Bulgaria is in the euro area, with 4.3% inflation, debt around 30% of GDP (among the lowest in the EU) and an investment-grade rating with a positive outlook. The closer historical parallel is in fact the 2014 banking crisis (the collapse of Corpbank and the payout of guaranteed deposits), which the critique conveniently passes over.[^corpbank] The Videnov comparison says something about direction and the absence of reform, but equating a euro-area, low-debt budget with the 1996 collapse conflates very different phenomena.
The critics want a 3% budget now, not in 2028. What does that cost? The simulator gives the precise answer: to drop from 5.7% to 3% this year you need additional consolidation of about €3.43bn on the cash basis (≈ 2.7 percentage points of GDP; ≈ €3.0bn on the ESA basis) — and that's on top of everything the budget already does. This isn't a tweak; it's a cut the size of the entire annual budget for defence and the interior combined.
Below, each lever is costed with the simulator — on an annual basis and with the behavioural response included (which is why the amounts are smaller than the "textbook" ones; raise a rate and the base shrinks). A mid-year start further dampens the effect for 2026 — another argument for why the government spreads the consolidation out.
| Lever | Annual effect (with behaviour) |
|---|---|
| VAT 20→21% / →22% / →23% | +€403 / +€799 / +€1,188M |
| Income tax (flat) 10→11% / →12% / →13% | +€368 / +€734 / +€1,099M |
| Corporate 10→12% / →15% | +€602 / +€1,468M |
| Dividend tax 5→10% | +€45M (static €75M; calibrated to the Fiscal Council ceiling) |
| МОД ceiling €2,300 → €2,500 / removed | +€70 / +€693M (over the €2,300 already in the budget) |
| Administration: headcount −10% / −20% / −30% | +€30 / +€230 / +€430M |
| Budget-sector wages: deepen −10%→−15% / →−20% | +€218 / +€437M (over the −10% already budgeted) |
| Pensions: CPI-only indexation (instead of the Swiss rule) | +€479M (≈ half in 2026 — indexation from 1 July) |
| Capital expenditure (national) −10% / −20% | +€185 / +€371M |
| Collection / grey economy (+€1bn claimed) | +€400M (the model banks only 40%) |
Three illustrative packages, each of which closes the gap:
The single most contested revenue lever is removing the МОД ceiling altogether: it adds about €693M (close to a fifth of the gap) on its own — but it directly raises employers' costs on higher salaries (and employers traditionally resist lifting the ceiling), which is why we put it in none of the packages above. The milder rise to €2,500 yields just ~€70M.
And that's the key takeaway: you don't get to 3% in a single year by "cutting the administration" alone. The non-exempt budget-sector wage bill that's even amenable to cuts is only ~€2.8bn, so even draconian cuts add hundreds of millions, not billions. The arithmetic forces either a broad tax increase (VAT/income tax) or touching pensions — most likely both. That is precisely why spreading the consolidation to 2028 isn't only political timidity: the one-year hit is enormous. But it's also the opposite of an excuse — choosing "later" means two more years of deficits and accumulated debt. Open the simulator and assemble your own package: you'll see just how narrow the path really is.
The picture is mixed. The budget at least doesn't flatter its starting position — it books a deficit larger even than the European Commission's own forecast, which can be read two ways: as candour about the inherited imbalances, or as front-loading all the pain into the first year of the term so the later ones look better. Its arithmetic holds up: deficit, debt and the main measures pass the simulator check, and debt stays low by European standards.
But the critics have a substantive point on two counts. First, the reforms are thin — the measures are mostly one-off (5% indexation, freezes, linear cuts) rather than structural (merging agencies, reviewing spending lines, privatisation / public-private partnerships). Second, part of the revenue is soft — a few hundred million euros of "collection" and "efficiency" that the execution record suggests rarely materialise in full. Whether the "smooth consolidation" actually happens will only become clear in the 2027 budget, when the cushion of European Recovery-Plan money will also be gone. And much of the dispute itself is less about the facts than about which measure you cite — cash vs accrual, КФП vs ESA.
Every number here can be checked: open the Budget dashboard for the live cash execution and the simulator to run your own scenarios against the same official figures.
_Methodology and sources. The framework figures are from the draft ЗДБРБ-2026 and АСБП 2026–2028 tabled in the National Assembly (Ministry of Finance, 24 June 2026). The "check" figures are from an actual run of the budget simulator engine (src/lib/bgTaxPolicy.ts, src/lib/bgFiscalProjection.ts), whose baseline rests on the 2025 cash execution and the EC's spring forecast. Quotes from politicians and economists are from media published between 24 and 25 June 2026, named individually below._
[^doc]: Ministry of Finance — draft State Budget Law of the Republic of Bulgaria for 2026 (Art. 1, 51, 65–67) and the Updated Medium-Term Budget Forecast 2026–2028 (explanatory memorandum, tables I-2, II-1, II-2, VI-1), tabled in the National Assembly on 24 June 2026.
[^euronews]: "The cabinet presented a 2026 budget with a 5.7% deficit," Euronews Bulgaria, 24.06.2026 — https://euronews.bg/news/kabinetat-predstavi-byudzhet-za-2026-g-s-5-7-defitsit/
[^mediapool]: "The 'Radev' cabinet tables Budget 2026 with an over-deficit of 5.7%," Mediapool, 24.06.2026 — https://www.mediapool.bg/kabinetat-radev-vnasya-byudzhet-2026-sas-svrahdefitsit-ot-57-obnovena-news384789.html
[^sega]: "The government presented a 2026 budget with an over-deficit of 5.7%," Sega, 24.06.2026 — https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-economy/pravitelstvoto-predstavi-byudzhet-za-2026-g-svruhdeficit-57
[^cik]: Results of the election for the 52nd National Assembly, 19 April 2026 — Central Election Commission; summarised in the 19.04.2026 results on electionsbg (Progressive Bulgaria 1,444,920 votes / 44.59% / 131 seats; turnout 51.11%).
[^econ-gov]: "Bulgaria officially has a new regular government," economic.bg, 08.05.2026 — https://www.economic.bg/bg/a/view/bylgarija-oficialno-ima-novo-redovno-pravitelstvo
[^bikov]: "Bikov: If the budget is adopted in this form, progress will resemble the time when the BSP and Zhan Videnov governed," Fakti.bg, 24.06.2026 — https://fakti.bg/bulgaria/1063220-bikov-ako-budjetat-bade-priet-v-tozi-mu-vid-progresat-shte-e-shoden-s-vremeto-kogato-bsp-i-jan-videnov-upravlavaha
[^db-ottegli]: "DB: We insist the finance minister withdraw and rework the proposed Budget 2026," Fakti.bg, 25.06.2026 — https://fakti.bg/bulgaria/1063347-db-nastoavame-finansoviat-ministar-da-ottegli-i-preraboti-predlojenia-budjet-2026
[^db-statement]: "DB: Once again we have the old budget," news.bg, 25.06.2026 — https://news.bg/politics/db-otnovo-imame-stariya-byudzhet.html
[^bb]: Statement by Bozhidar Bozhanov (DB) on the draft budget, 24.06.2026 — https://boulevardbulgaria.bg/articles/administrativen-natisk-i-defitsit-ot-vremeto-na-vremeto-na-videnov-reaktsiite-za-proektobyudzheta-na-kabineta-radev
[^kostadinov]: "I saw Radev's budget. In two words — a complete catastrophe" (Kostadin Kostadinov), novini247/Focus, 24.06.2026 — https://www.focus-news.net/novini/Bylgaria/Kostadin-Kostadinov-za-proektobyudzhet-2026-godina-Pulna-katastrofa-2986036
[^vasilev-pc]: Press conference by Asen Vasilev (PP) on the draft 2026 budget, Clubz.bg, June 2026 — https://clubz.bg/176394 ; figures cross-checked against АСБП 2026–2028, Appendix 3 (Consolidated Fiscal Programme 2023–2028).
[^fakti-obzor]: "With a whiff of the Videnov era: opposition and economists up in arms over Budget 2026 (overview)," Fakti.bg, 24–25.06.2026 — https://fakti.bg/mnenia/1063359-s-dah-na-videnovoto-vreme-opozicia-i-ikonomisti-na-noj-sreshtu-budjet-2026-obzor
[^plovdiv24-yankov]: "Nikola Yankov: The draft budget is a despairing demonstration of fear and zero reform," Plovdiv24, 25.06.2026 — https://www.plovdiv24.bg/novini/Bylgaria/Nikola-Yankov-Proektobyudzhetut-e-otchaivashta-demonstraciya-na-strah-i-nuleva-reforma-ot-kakvato-Bulgariya-nyama-nuzhda-2986244
[^econbg]: "A big mistake or a step in the right direction? Economists are divided over Budget 2026" (Sterio Nozharov, Georgi Vuldzhev), economic.bg, 25.06.2026 — https://www.economic.bg/bg/a/view/goljama-greshka-ili-stypka-v-pravilnata-posoka-ikonomistite-sa-razdeleni-za-budjet-2026
[^safenews-vasilev]: "Budget 2026 demolished! Nikolay Vasilev: the most disappointing budget in years," SafeNews, 24.06.2026 — https://safenews.bg/razgrom-na-byudzhet-2026-nikolaj-vasilev-tova-e-naj-razocharovasthiyat-byudzhet-ot-godini/
[^ime]: "IME: Budget 2026 will not be redrawn," news.bg / "No deferral of deficit consolidation," ime.bg — https://news.bg/finance/ipi-byudzhet-2026-nyama-da-bade-prekroen-vseki-grabi-ot-golyamata-pitsa.html ; https://ime.bg/articles/nyama-otsrochka-za-svivane-na-byudzhetniya-defitsit/
[^vitanov]: "Petar Vitanov: The deficit trajectory was above 7%, we cut it by 2% in four months," Focus, 25.06.2026 — https://www.focus-news.net/novini/Bylgaria/Petur-Vitanov-Traektoriyata-na-deficita-beshe-nad-7-nie-go-namalihme-s-2-za-4-meseca-2986511
[^prodanov]: Declaration by Konstantin Prodanov, chair of the Budget and Finance Committee (Progressive Bulgaria), June 2026; the accrual "intermediate consumption" figures for the general-government sector (€5,610.4M → €6,902.4M, +23%) are from АСБП 2026–2028, Table II-6.
[^karimanski]: "Lyubomir Karimanski: Criticism of the budget is premature," Fakti.bg, 25.06.2026 — https://fakti.bg/video/1063435-lubomir-karimanski-pred-fakti-kritikite-kam-budjeta-sa-pribarzani-video
[^knsb]: "KNSB position on the planned incomes policy in Budget 2026," knsb-bg.org, 22.05.2026 — https://knsb-bg.org/index.php/2026/05/22/pozicziya-na-knsb-otnosno-predvidenata-politika-po-dohodite-v-byudzhet-2026/
[^kostov]: "Unionist against Galab Donev: claiming the minimum wage strains the budget is economic demagoguery" (Lyuboslav Kostov, KNSB), Fakti.bg, 18.05.2026 — https://fakti.bg/bulgaria/1055206-sindikalist-sreshtu-galab-donev-da-se-tvardi-che-minimalnata-zaplata-napraga-budjeta-e-ikonomicheska-demagogia
[^manolov]: "Dimitar Manolov: In a situation like this, no good budget can be offered" (Podkrepa), Fakti.bg, 24.06.2026 — https://fakti.bg/bulgaria/1063249-dimitar-manolov-v-situacia-kato-tazi-ne-moje-da-bade-predlojen-dobar-budjet-napravili-sa-tova-koeto-sa-mogli
[^aikb]: "Business on Budget 2026: Bulgaria is heading for the cliff" (Vasil Velev, AIKB), SafeNews, 24.06.2026 — https://safenews.bg/biznesat-za-byudzhet-2026-balgariya-kara-kam-propastta-vreme-e-za-ryazak-zavoj-video/
[^fiscal]: Summary of the Fiscal Council's opinion on the draft State Budget Law (revenue-shortfall risk €3.5–4.7bn; November 2025 opinion) — https://www.fiscal-council.bg/bg/news/reziume-na-stanovishteto-na-fiskalnia-syvet-po-proekta-na-zakon-za-dyrjavnia-biudget-na-rb-za-2026
[^edp]: "European Commission recommends excessive deficit procedure for Bulgaria" (Valdis Dombrovskis), BTA, 03.06.2026 — https://www.bta.bg/en/news/economy/1139551-european-commission-recommends-excessive-deficit-procedure-for-bulgaria
[^sofiaglobe]: "EC recommends opening excessive deficit procedure against Bulgaria," The Sofia Globe, 03.06.2026 — https://sofiaglobe.com/2026/06/03/ec-recommends-opening-excessive-deficit-procedure-against-bulgaria/
[^corpbank]: "Seizure of Bulgaria's Corpbank" (KTB, 2014) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seizure_of_Bulgaria's_Corpbank